This paper introduces general formulations for both technology (with input substitution) and non-separable utility (compatible with balanced growth and stationary worked hours) into a benchmark RBC model. It is shown that intertemporal substitution and input substitutability lead to local determinacy and rule out stationary sunspot equilibria when labor demand is downward-sloping, in contrast with recent results obtained under the assumption of separable utility. The main intuition behind this result is shown to work as follows: in contrast with separable preferences, increasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption necessarily implies decreasing the elasticity of constant-consumption labor supply, when utility is non-separable and concave, which affects unfavorably the occurrence of local indeterminacy.
Introduction
A major challenge of the literature exploring expectation-driven business cycles is to provide models that pass the empirical tests, e.g. calibration. Bennett and Farmer [5] have argued that non-separable utility is a key element to achieve this objective. However, Hintermaier [6] has recently shown that assuming Cobb-Douglas technology and a downward-sloping labor demand rules out local indeterminacy, in contrast with the examples by Bennett and Farmer [5] which turn out to violate concavity. On the other hand, Pintus
[9] has stressed that local indeterminacy may occur with small externalities (and downward-sloping labor demand): this requires both risk aversion to be small enough (very close to zero, indeed, for reasonable parameter values) and input substitutability to be large enough (greater than two). However, he assumes that utility is separable in consumption and leisure. Taking all recent results together, one wonders whether or not departing from Cobb-Douglas technology (which is key in Pintus [9]) may overturn the result by and when labor demand has a negative slope, local indeterminacy requires both inputs to be complementary (or, equivalently, a very elastic rate of return on capital investment) and risk aversion to be small enough.
Moreover, when capital externalities are small enough, indeterminacy requires the coefficient of (relative) risk aversion to be less than the elasticity of capital-labor substitution. Therefore, when technology, starting from the Cobb-Douglas configuration, is getting closer to the Leontief case, risk aversion has therefore to decrease to zero. However, imposing that utility is concave in both consumption and labor implies that the lower risk aversion, the lower the (constant-consumption) labor supply elasticity to the real wage, which in fact goes to zero when risk aversion goes to zero. In other words, although intuition may suggest that decreasing risk aversion should increase the plausibility of indeterminacy (indeed, this is the case when separable utility is almost linear; see Pintus [9] ), this necessarily reduces labor supply elasticity when utility is non-separable and concave, which makes indeterminacy less likely. In contrast, separable utility allows to treat labor supply elasticity as a parameter that is independent of risk aversion. This also explains why complementary inputs are needed to get indeterminacy. As noted above, labor supply is close to inelastic when risk aversion is small so that wage and interest rate have to be elastic enough to move labor hours, i.e. technology has to be close to the Leontief case (see also the discussion in Bennett and Farmer [5, ).
It turns out that, in our model with input substitution and non-separable utility, there is no net gain in terms of indeterminacy being more plausible. It is worth noting that our formulation of non-separability does not nest the separable case studied by Pintus [9]: equation (3) below shows that separability implies logarithmic consumption utility, which is less general than separable utility as assumed in Pintus [9] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the extended Ramsey model, following Bennett and Farmer [5] and Pintus [9] , and derives its perfect-foresight competitive equilibria. Section 3 establishes some necessary conditions for indeterminacy to occur and establishes the main result. Finally, Section 4 concludes, while the proofs are gathered in two appendices.
